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THE WHEAT POLL

DO WHEAT PRODUCERS FAVOR MANDATORY LIMITS ON PRODUCTION?
Edward Smith, Extension Economist-Grain Marketing andPoiicy
Mechei Paggi, Extension Economist-lnternationai Trade

JamesRichardson, Professor, Texas Agricultural Experiment Station
Ronald D. Knutson, Extension Economist-Policy and Marketing, and Professor
Texas A&M University System

Wheat producers in the U.S. will soon receive a ballot

from USDA asking a question similar to that posed in the
title of this article. The poll is beingconducted as one of the

requirements of the Food Security Act of 1985 (farm bill).
The outcome of the poll, however, does not bind the Secre

• What does the Secretary of Agriculture consider to
be the cost of wheat production?

• What quantities of wheat would be sold if prices
were increased to 125% of this cost of production?
• How much will production need to be cut to

tary of Agriculture to establish mandatory controls.
The 1985 farm bill states, "Not laterthanJuly 1,1986,

maintain theprice at 125% ofthecost ofproduction?
• What mandatory supply-management options are

ballot, of eligible producers of wheat to determine whether"

• What are the consequences of continuing with the

the Secreta^ ofAgriculture shall conduct a poll, by mail

suchproducers favor the imposition ofmandatory limits on
the produaionofwheat thatwill result in wheat prices that
are notlower than 125% ofthecost ofproduction (excluding
land and residual returns to management) as determined by
the Secretary." Only those producers who have grown
wheat in at least one crop year from 1981-1985 on a farm

with a wheat base ofat least 40acres will beeligible to vote.
Although this poll is non-binding, it should not be
taken lightly. Itsinclusion inthefarm bill reflects agrowing
demand for mandatory production controls byproducers in

the wheat industry as well as other producer groups
frustrated by surplus production and low farm prices.
Producers, therefore, must consider the many consequences
before answering this simple question.

This article explores the question of mandatory
production controls as well as other supply-management
alternatives and their consequences for wheat producers.
The purpose of this article is to provide wheat producers
with information that should be considered in their decision
on how to vote. Of course, the discussion in this article

focuses on the implications of supply control and does not
suggest how a producer should vote in the poll.
Before Making the Decision
Most producers would like to have answers to a

available?

current farm program?

These are not easy questions to answer. We consider

thefollowing analysis reasonable, given available information.
What is the Cost of Producing Wheat?

There probably areas many answers tothis question as
there are wheat producers. USDA, however, is required by
Congress to estimate the cost of producing wheat, feed
grains, cotton, and dairy commodities each year. Based on
previous USDA cost of production estimates, we estimate

This

Economics Newsletter is a reproduction

of a report, written by Texas A&M University
agricultural economists.

The report reviews

the potential impacts of imposing mandatory
production controls on wheat producers.

A mail ballot asking producers if they favor
mandatory

production controls will be

out around the middle of June.

sent

This is not

the same as the marketing quota referendum
which must be completed by August 1, 1986.

number of questions before voting "yes" or "no" on
mandatory production controls. Some questions toconsider

Richard Shane

include:

Grain Marketing Specialist
South Dakota State Univ.

. A
Mandatory Acreage Controls
Mandatory acreage controls or allotments would
allow wheat production on a specific number of acres
allotted to each farm based on its share of the national

allotment necessary to meet the Administration's supply-

and export requirements as well as emergency food aid \
heeds and adequate carryover stocks.
After the establishment of the national quota, the
Secretary would assigna marketing quota for each farm on
whichwheatwas planted or consideredplanted for harvest

management objectives. Acreage allotments were used

' during the 1981-1985 base period. The marketing quota

extensively in the 1950's and 60's and still exist in tobacco.

would be equal to the product derived by multiplying the
farm's baseacreage byits farm programyieldand reduced
by the appropriatepercentage necessary to bring national
marketing down to the level of national quota. Penalties

Experience has shown that when acreage allotments

are used,in the absence ofmarketing quotas, the program
is ineffective in limiting production to the desired level.
Farmers select their best acreage and farm the allotted
acreage more intensively. The result is increased produc

tion per acre,requiringfurther tightening ofthe allotment
in future years.

If the Secretary determined, as in our analysis, that
57% of the wheat base would have to be removed from

grainproduction to meet the needs ofthe market at aprice
of S4.04/bushel, farmers might only be allowed to plant
wheat for grain on 43% of their allotted acreage. The
question that immediately surfaces is, "What can we do
with the idled acreage?" Allowances for use of the idled

would be assessed to producers who marketed wheat
beyond their assigned quotas.

The Secretary has the authority to announce a
marketing quota for wheat to cover the crop years 19871990. To implement a quota under the 1985 farm bill
provisions,the Secretary must proclaimthe national wheat

quota by June 15, 1986. He must also conduct, by mail
ballot, a marketing quota referendum by August 1, 1986.
This referendum is separate from the non-binding poll
conducted in June, which is the topic of this paper. The
Secretary may proclaim that marketing quotas arein effect

acreage become extremely important to producers in

for 1987-1990 if he determines that 60% or more of the

determining their preference for this type of mandatory

eligible producers, voting in the referendum, approved

program.

The rules for transfer of the allotment are also very

marketing quotas. According to the 1985 farm bill, the

national quota could be terminated or adjusted in any

important. If the allotment is tied to the land and non-

marketing year the Secretary determines there exists a

transferable, then the price of land tends to be bid-up. If
allotments aretransferable, then anyprofits resulting from

national emergency or there has been a material change in

the allotmentwillbe quicklycapitalizedinto the allotment's

the demand for wheat. Our analysis indicates that a

reduction in export andfeed use demand would be likely.
Previous experience with supply control programs

value. Is the landowner better off? The answer depends
againon whathe cando with his idledacreage. Ifthe idled

indicates that marketing quotas are the most effective

acres can be profitably farmed, then the producer would

means ofcontrolling production because there is virtually

gain from the capitalized value of the allotment as well as
from the earnings oh wheat. If the idled acres cannot be
farmed, the capitalized value of the allotment must be
offset against the reduced value of land that cannot be

no slippage. Quotas are, however, hard to maintain

because ofpolitical pressure to increase the national quota
once it is established.

As was the case with acreage allotments, the use of

farmed and the cost of controlling weeds and erosion on

idled cropland is a big factor in a producer's decision to

the idled land.

favor a marketing quota. Many ofthesame consequences

Allotments tied to a specific crop tend to restria the

may apply.

farmer's ability toadjust crop mixes inresponse tochanges

In thecase ofmandatory acreage controls ormarketing

in relative crop prices. If idled acreage is allowed to be

quotas, the incidence of government involvement in

planted to alternative crops, furthermore, it could result in

surpluses for non-allotment crops, thus tending to force
these producers to elea allotments for their crops.

The bottom line is thatfarmers are notautomatically
better offfrom mandatory acreage controls. Whether they
are better off depends on the rules of the game and each
specific situation. At this point, we do not know the rules

under which mandatory controls would operate.
Marketing Quotas

It is not surprising that the 1985 farm.bill, under its,

wheat title, has a marketing quota section immediately
following the section requiring the "Wheat Poll." A
marketing quota is a mandatory mechanism which deter
mines the quantity of a commodity that can be marketed.
The national quota, set by the Secretary of Agriculture, is

based on the quantity of wheat necessary to meet the
expected market needs, taking into consideration domestic

agriculture is high. In terms of taxpayerdollars,however,

mandatory programs are relatively inexpensive supplymanagement alternatives.

What Are the Consequences

Of Continuing the Current Program?
The current program calls for voluntary compliance
in announced acreage reduction programs in return for

direct government income support (deficiency) payments
and access to price support loans. In addition, authoriza
tion exists for a 45 million acre conservation reserve.
Voluntary acreage limitations call for different levels

of idled acreage each -year, depending on the projected
carryovers. If carryover stocks are expected to exceed 1

billion bushels (highly likely for the next few years), the
annual acreage reduction requirement will be between

20-30% (20-27.5%) in 1987 of base acreage. If stocks are
expected to be less than 1 billion bushels, the acreage
reduction requirements would be not more than 20%.

tKe national average cost ofproducing wheat (excluding land
and residual returns to management) to be about $3.23/

bushel. The objective of a mandatory production control
program, therefore, would be to raise the price of wheat to

about $4.04/bushel (1.25 times $3.23/bushel).
How Much Wheat Can Be Sold?

The answer tothis question is vital toouranalysis since
it determines the level ofproduction necessary tosustain a
$4.04/bushel market-price. Unfortunately, there is no
simple answer. The quantity of wheat sold at $4.04/bushel
•will depend onamyriad offaaorsaffecting thedomestic and
export sectors. Due to the importance of the answer to this
question, further examination of these sectors is warranted.

market. USDA's estimate of 900 million bushels for the
1985/86 marketing year marks the first time since 1971
that importers will demand less U.S. wheat than the

domestic seaor. The decline in exports (Figure 1) has
occurred because of: a strong U.S. dollar, U.S. price
support levels (loan rates) exceeding world market levels,

foreign coinpetition, and aheavy debt load in many develop
ing countries.

The export wheat market is highly competitive. An
increase in the U.S. wheat price would place the United

States soundly in the position of a residual supplier. A

conservative response to a U.S. price increase to $4.04/
bushel would result in a drop in exports to 750 million
bushels.

This analysis suggests that the total demandfor U.S.

Domestic Use

Domestic wheat utilization can be categorized into
three components: food, seed, and feed. As shown in
Figure 1, the major domestic use of wheat is in the food

wheat could fall by 21% from 1985 levels to approximately

1.56 billion bushels ifU.S. wheat prices were supported at

$4.04/bushel.

sector. Wheat for food use, however, has been virtually
non-responsive to price. Food demand, thus, would be

expected to decline only moderately to approximately 650
million bushels if price is increased to 14.04/bushel to the
farmer.

Seed use is a fimction ofplanted acreage and seeding
rate. The planted acreage will vary depending on such
faaors as grain needs, livestock grazing needs, wheat's use as
a cover aop on aaes idledimdergovernment programs, and

wheat's importance in double aopping systems. For the
purpose ofthis malysis, we assume seed usage at 70 million
bushels, down 22% from 1985 leyels.

Feed use has varied over the last several years (Figure
1) depending on the price relationship between wheat and
competing feed grains. If mandatory produaion controls
were implemented for wheat irrespective ofthe feed grain
seaor, it is likely that the amount of wheat used as feed

would drop significantly. For the purpose ofthis analysis,
we assume annual feed use to decline to 90 million bushels.

How Much Would Production Need to Be Cut?
In 1985, U.S. wheat producers harvested 2.43 billion

bushels from 64.7 niillion acres. Ignoring, for the moment,
record levels of carryover (Figure 1), the United States

would have to reduce wheat production by about 36% to
meet the 1.56 billion bushel demand estimated in the

previous section. Further reduction would be necessary, in
the short run, ifthe wheat already in government storage
were allowed to enter the market.

Assuming minimal production control program
slippage (slippage is that portion ofreduced acreage which
does not result in correspondingly lower production, e.g.,

due toidling thepoorest land) resulting ina39 bushel/acre
average yield, the projeaed demand of 1.56 billion bushels

could be produced on 40.0 million harvested acres—only
43% ofthe wheat base for 1986. Inother words, 57%ofthe

wheat base would need to be removed from grain produc

tion to support a market clewing price of $4.04/bushel.

Export Use

Since the early 70's when the dollar was allowed to

float relative to other currencies, the export seaor has

traditionally absorbed more wheat than the domestic
Figuno 1.
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What Mandatory Supply
Control Options Are Available?

Mandatory production control programs can take

many forms. This discussion, however, will focus on

mandatoiy acreage controls and marketing quotas. The

analysis in the previous section applies to eitlicr form of
produaion control.

USDA may take the position that even if an over
whelming majority of the farmers vote in favor of

mandatory produaion controls, ithas no authority to imple
ment them. The 1985 farm bill contains authority for
establishing marketing quotas in wheat. USDA's position
could be that from alegal perspeaive, marketing controls
(quotas) are not production controls. However, under
conditions of asufficiently overwhelming favorable vote,

the marketing quota authority in the 1985 farm bill might

still be utilized. Alternatively, Congress could enact new

legislation authorizing acreage allotments or providing

legal interpretation of marketing quotas as a tool for
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Theconservation reserve program provides for up to
45million acres oflandbeingtakenout ofproduction fora
10 year period. Available USDA data suggest that about
25% of this land (11.3 million acres) would have wheat
base. This is about 22%ofthe land that would be taken out

of grain production under a mandatory control program
that was designed to raise the price of wheat to $4.04/
bushel. The main question surrounding the conservation
reserve program is whether the money is going to be
appropriated to remove 45 million acresfrom production.
With potential Gramm-Rudmann-Hollings budget cut
restrictions on funding, this program could suffer.
Continuation of the current farm program would

likely result in farm level prices being determined by the
loanrateforthe next few years. In addition, the presence of
large carryover stocks would likely lead to further reduc
tions in the loan rate based on the loan rate formula in the
1985 farm bill. It would be difficult for the market to
absorb the expected 1.88 billion bushels of stocks on hand

asofJune 1,1986,with the acreage reductionrequirements
called for in the farm bill. Voluntary acreage reduction

bill. Initial indications arethatinrice, where themarketing
loan is currently ineffect, exports increase as market prices
fall to the world price level. Government payments
initially rise sharply, offsetting the fall in market price.
Once stocks are drawn down, however, market prices
should rise above current levels. Regardless of whether the
marketing loan is used, the current program will be
relatively costly to the U.S. treasury.
Conclusions

The "Wheat Poll," althoughnon-binding, couldhave
important implications for future wheat programs. The
market says we have overproduced. Effectively managed
mandatory production controls provide an orderly way to
get resources out of agriculture.

The decision to vote in favor or against mandatory
production controls is multi-faceted. Producers must

consider the short- and long-run consequencesof manda
tory supply controls versus the current program. The basic
choice is between the current voluntary program with

relatively high government costs and lower market prices

programs have never been a very effective tool for control
ling production due to slippage.

and a mandatory program that costs less but could result in

A policy scenario which could lead to different price
results involves the implementation of a wheat marketing

and considerably lower production. In anyevent,as in any

loan by the Secretary, which is authorized in the 1985farm

preference known.

relatively higher prices, lower export and feed demand,
political issue, it is important that farmers make their
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